It does however beg another question: Is China paying close attention? What about the ramifications of invading Taiwan? This of course becomes more of a plausible reality since the announcement of the U.S. threatening to invade Greenland. I can’t believe I just typed the last five words of the previous sentence and I’m glad it’s officially off the table. Quite frankly, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would trigger the single largest trade shock of the 21st century. Global maritime trade would be severely disrupted since the Taiwan Strait is one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors. Over one fifth of global maritime trade — about $2.45 trillion in goods — passes through the strait, and China alone relies on the strait for $1.4 trillion of its own imports and exports. Over half of the voyages through the strait are Chinese domestic shipping routes that would come to a halt as an invasion shuts down or militarizes this corridor, instantly disrupting energy shipments, manufacturing inputs, intra China coastal logistics, and global container flows. This would be a systemic shock, not a regional one as the semiconductor supply chain collapses. Taiwan produces the world’s most advanced chips and accounts for 92% of advanced semiconductor manufacturing via TSMC which alone makes over 75% of all AI chips used by Apple, Nvidia, Google, and others, and this is the primary reason for the invasion, and not reunification, just like the U.S. and Greenland, as previously mentioned, it’s not about national security but rare earth minerals, which, I get it, one could tie to national security indirectly. Think about it, if semiconductor trade gets blocked global electronics production halts, AI infrastructure stalls, automotive manufacturing collapses, and cloud computing and data center expansion freezes. Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Oracle and even China’s own Alibaba would lose billions overnight. And this is just a fraction of the losses, as Bloomberg estimates up to $10 trillion in global economic losses in the first year. This is larger than the 2008 financial crisis and COVID 19 combined. China depends on the Taiwan Strait for distribution of oil, coal, natural gas, ores and metals used in manufacturing so the disruption in trade flows causes global oil and LNG price spikes, shortages of critical metals, and cascading inflation across manufacturing sectors. The mandatory sanctions for the invasion would likely include export controls on Chinese tech, embargoes on Chinese goods, asset freezes, and restrictions on shipping and finance. China’s export driven economy would be hit hard as exports are 20% of China’s GDP. If a company wasn’t already considering exiting China, this would be the catalyst to relocate manufacturing to India, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Mexico, or Eastern Europe.

What about Venezuela? A U.S. invasion of Venezuela has somewhat already taken place as the U.S. is apparently running the country from the Whitehouse. The U.S. military operation in Venezuela has not produced a classic “trade shock” across the global economy, but it has dramatically affected oil flows, shipping behavior, sanctions risk, and the trade positions of specific countries. The effects are concentrated, not systemic, but they are still significant, especially to both The Kremlin and Beijing. It wasn’t a kidnapping/arrest of Maduro for possible regime change since the same regime is still “kind of” in power, but more of an oil grab, based on what the U.S. felt was owed, and what the oil offered in future revenue. Of course, the future revenue is in question as Exxon/Mobile’s CEO Darren Woods called Venezuela “uninvestable.” This does take into consideration that the company is still owed roughly $2 billion from its previous partnership with the Venezuelan government, but this fact never found its way into the negotiation. I will say though, kudos to the Trump Administration as they did recently manage to sell $500 million of the oil, but the buyer is a secret. Hmmmm. The proceeds are being placed in U.S.-controlled accounts, including one in Qatar. Multiple reports confirm that U.S. attacks and enforcement actions have sharply disrupted Venezuela’s oil exports. U.S. seizures of Venezuelan oil cargoes and a blockade of tankers cut exports by about half from late 2024 levels. After the military operation, tanker loading at major ports largely stalled, with vessels leaving empty or rerouting. The most direct trade effect is that Venezuela’s oil exports temporarily collapsed. This means Venezuela can produce oil but cannot move it, which is a classic sanctions driven trade choke. Venezuela holds 18% of global oil reserves, more than Saudi Arabia or the U.S. itself. This means the trade impact is not just about disruption, but future control of supply. This was deemed necessary by many as the Venezuelan government was inept at keeping the oil flowing via corruption and simply letting the delivery infrastructure deteriorate. Daily oil production had dropped from a peak of 3.4 million barrels a day to just roughly 850,000 today. Where were China and Russia during this decline? Of note, India’s trade with Venezuela is also disrupted, but the Trump Administration doesn’t care because they were buying cheap oil from Russia and were considered to be indirectly supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine. India is one of the few countries where the trade impact in this case is clearly disruptive, as imports from Venezuela have fallen to negligible levels due to U.S. sanctions. Peak flow to India was 441,000 barrels a day back in 2015. However, the U.S. operation could unlock $1 billion in long pending dues for ONGC Videsh and other Indian firms. If sanctions are lifted, India could diversify away from Russian crude and increase Venezuelan purchases. Imagine that. There is a profound impact on China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba. These countries condemned the U.S. action and face a loss of preferential access to Venezuelan oil (especially China), increased geopolitical pressure and reduced leverage in Latin America. The trade effect here is strategic, not immediate as their influence over Venezuelan resources weakens significantly.

Let’s turn now to the U.S. involvement in Iran where sanctions, tariff threats, and financial pressure have reshaped Iran’s trade patterns more than almost any other external factor. The U.S. has weaponized trade pressure against Iran. The most recent and consequential action is the U.S. threat to impose a 25% tariff on any country that continues trading with Iran. This is not a sanction on Iran itself, but instead a secondary tariff designed to punish other countries for doing business with Iran. This dramatically raises the cost of trading with Iran for China, India, Turkey, UAE, Germany, and Russia as these are Iran’s largest trading partners, and all are directly exposed to U.S. retaliation. Iran’s oil exports are the primary target as fuel is Iran’s largest export by value. China alone buys more than 80% of Iran’s shipped oil. U.S. pressure has reduced Iran’s pool of oil buyers, forced Iran to rely on a “shadow fleet” of tankers to evade sanctions, and pushed more oil sales into opaque, discounted channels. This reduces Iran’s revenue and increases global oil market uncertainty. This tariff forces many countries to choose between access to the American market and continued trade with Tehran. For many economies — especially India, Turkey, and the EU — the U.S. market is far more valuable, so the pressure is effective. China is the most exposed since they are Iran’s largest trading partner, with $37 billion in total bilateral trade in 2022 (World Bank estimate) that has now dropped to around $8 billion in 2025. A 25% U.S. tariff on China–U.S. trade would be economically painful, so Beijing must weigh cheap Iranian oil vs. access to the U.S. market. This is exactly the leverage the U.S. intends to create. India’s trade with Iran is modest but strategically important. India’s bilateral trade with Iran reached $1.34 billion in the first 10 months of 2025. In the bigger picture the U.S. involvement equates to global trade fragmentation. U.S. actions would accelerate a broader trend as countries split into “U.S.-aligned” vs. “Iran/China-aligned” trade blocs. More trade also would move through informal or shadow channels as global supply chains become more politicized.

What about the potential U.S. invasion of Greenland? Is that still a thing? As previously mentioned in my opening, NO, according to President Trump while currently in Davos to negotiate with a hostile crowd by initially calling Denmark ungrateful, and the EU stupid. Let’s still take a look at NATO country vs. NATO countries for grins, and just because it’s one of the dumbest things imaginable on a global scale. Look at the now cancelled tariffs that were to be slapped on EU countries of 10% on February 1st, with the threat of 25% more on June 1st if the U.S. doesn’t get awarded control of Greenland. Cooler heads have prevailed, and we apparently now have a deal that “Gets us everything we need” but the damage is already done with former allies Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Finland, and The United Kingdom. In the grand scheme of building a Golden Dome which must include Greenland and knowing that this multi-country arrangement stands an outside chance of failing at any point, let’s go down the rabbit hole anyway and just say that the U.S. Congress was weak once again, and failed to block President Trumps mandate to invade. Afterall, he has been known to change his mind, and turn on a dime, as they say. So, hypothetically speaking now, and as a reminder of severe consequences, an invasion of Greenland would have triggered one of the most severe trade ruptures between the United States and Europe in modern history. U.S.–EU trade would be thrown into crisis, if it isn’t already there in many cases, as tariff retaliation was currently in discussion. For starters, France’s finance minister warned that a U.S. attempt to seize Greenland, a sovereign part of Denmark and therefore part of the EU, would severely damage economic ties between Washington and Brussels. Top analysts agree that the EU could respond with tariffs and/or sanctions and the situation could escalate into a full-blown trade war between the U.S. and Europe. Denmark–U.S. trade would of course collapse since Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark and they would treat the invasion as an attack on its sovereignty, rightly so, and EU solidarity mechanisms would activate. NATO cooperation would be thrown into absolute doubt as to its policy for existence, which the U.S. President is currently questioning in Davos by stating that it hasn’t done enough for the U.S. This NATO fracture would freeze or severely restrict U.S.–Denmark trade flows. Speaking of a freeze, Arctic shipping routes would become both politicized and militarized. Analysts note that the U.S. wants Greenland partly to control emerging Arctic shipping lanes and keep rivals like China and Russia out. I wrote an article about that: https://www.braumillerlaw.com/coming-soon-a-new-polar-icebreaker-competition-in-the-arctic-region-for-trade-route-supremacy/ This now currently shelved insane invasion would therefore militarize the Arctic, and force shipping companies to reroute or pay higher insurance. It would also trigger counter moves by Russia and China and increase volatility in Arctic resource and logistics markets. If you took the time to read my article on Greenland’s global significance, you’d know that Greenland contains 36–42 million metric tons of rare earth minerals. So, if the U.S. acquires Greenland, even via a sale, it gains control of a major non Chinese rare earth source, which is key to advanced chip manufacturing. China (which dominates global rare earth processing) I wrote an article on that topic: https://www.braumillerlaw.com/rare-earth-minerals-and-chinas-global-dominance/) would retaliate economically and the EU, given our current situation, would lose access to a potential future supply it considers strategic. Global mineral markets would become more fragmented and politicized much more than they currently are. This would reshape supply chains for EVs, wind turbines, electronics, and defense. Markets despise uncertainty, and this would be a geopolitical shock unlike anything in the Arctic since the Cold War. U.S. tariff policy would continue to escalate the conflict as many companies would be facing survival mode of operation deploying whatever tariff mitigation strategies are available to them. This could be a replay of the U.S.–China trade war peak at 125%-150% tariffs, but with European allies. Let’s face it, a NATO crisis is a trade crisis as security architecture and trade architecture are tightly linked, break one, and the other follows. At this very moment in time, President Trump is however directly calling out NATO members for lack of support over the years and is berating Europe in general. He stated that the U.S. is the only country capable of defending Greenland. Obviously, NATO members will agree to differ. This posturing does not bode well for the future of EU-US trade relations, which have currently been put on hold indefinitely.

Moving right along on scorched earth, what if the U.S. invades Mexico to go after the Cartels? President Sheinbaum has already warned the Trump Administration that this would be totally unacceptable. At this time, yes, President Trump is threatening boots on the ground to go after the Cartels. President Sheinbaum has recently offered up 37 Cartel members as an olive branch, which most likely will not be anywhere near enough to appease the Whitehouse even though they have sent 92 total in the past year. Apparently, these members were the worst of the worst from the various Cartels, making them somewhat more valuable. Without a doubt, a U.S. invasion of Mexico to get to the Cartels would trigger the most severe North American trade shock in modern history, far beyond anything seen in tariff disputes or political tensions. Mexico is beyond deeply integrated into the U.S. market via the USMCA and U.S. pressure of even tariff threats alone have caused measurable economic damage. An actual invasion would multiply those effects dramatically. North American supply chains would collapse since Mexico is the largest goods exporter to the U.S., with exports exceeding $500 billion in 2024, and estimated to be around $700 billion in 2025, equal to 29% of Mexico’s GDP. An invasion would instantly shut down cross border manufacturing flows, halt just in time auto and electronics supply chains. freeze rail, trucking, and air cargo routes, and trigger corporate evacuations and factory shutdowns. The automotive sector would be hit first and hardest. Mexico is a key player in North American auto production and is deeply tied to U.S. content and U.S. buyers. An invasion would shut down cross border auto parts flows, halt assembly plants in both countries, cause immediate shortages of cars, trucks, and components, and force U.S. automakers to idle factories within days. Over 6,000 IMMEX would stop producing product bound for the U.S. and a North American recession becomes likely as the invasion causes a collapse in investor confidence, triggers capital flight, a peso freefall, freezes foreign direct investment, and disrupts U.S. manufacturing and retail supply chains. The U.S. would also face recessionary pressure due to supply chain breakdowns and price spikes. The USMCA would be functionally destroyed, but it may be anyway with the upcoming review in July of this year. I wrote a recent article on that: https://www.braumillerlaw.com/the-upcoming-usmca-cusma-t-mec-review-the-options-are-a-renegotiation-a-few-revisions-or-a-formal-exit/ In this upcoming USMCA negotiation pre-invasion, the U.S. representatives need to keep in mind that Mexico supplies the U.S. with vehicles, electronics, machinery, produce and food, medical devices, and household goods. An invasion would cause massive shortages, raise prices sharply, disrupt retail supply chains and ultimately hit low income U.S. households hardest. Inflation would surge and global markets would react with shock and retaliation. Imagine that, the U.S., Mexico and Canada trade agreement would be absolutely crushed.

Which brings to mind the current U.S. and Canadian tensions, which has taken another nose-dive with recent comments by President Trump in Davos saying that Canada exists only because of the U.S. Canada has been studying a model of a potential U.S. invasion, but come on, would the U.S. ever actually invade Canada? Insert a good chuckle here because it reminds me of the South Park episodes called “Blame Canada” which had us going to war with each other based on the dumbest of reasons. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOR38552MJA Sounds like a joke, but so did the U.S. suggesting annexing it to become the 51st state. Trade between the U.S. and Canada hasn’t collapsed, but the tensions have clearly distorted trade flows, raised uncertainty, and pushed Canada to diversify away from the U.S. primarily to the EU and China. Carney’s recent visit to Beijing secured an open market for both countries…. relenting on the canola and EV tariff war. Regarding the U.S., the ongoing tariffs and “trade war” have disrupted normal flows. Statistics via Canada data shows that pockets of Canadian trade remain “significantly impacted by tariffs.” Canada’s overall trade balance flipped from a surplus to a deficit in October 2025 because of tariff driven distortions. Imports from the U.S. rose 5.3% in October — the first increase in four months — while exports to the U.S. fell 3.4%. Canada’s trade surplus with the U.S. was cut nearly in half in a single month. This is exactly what you’d expect when tariffs and political tensions create uncertainty as imports surge in anticipation of future restrictions, while exports fall due to U.S. barriers and weaker demand. The political climate, including U.S. threats toward Greenland and broader hemispheric dominance rhetoric, has pushed Ottawa to the edge. Carney made this well known in Davos recently when he stepped up to the mic and argued that the U.S.-led global order has fractured, describing it as a “rupture, not a transition. He has also previously stated to the world that the longstanding system built around American hegemony with open sea lanes, stable finance, and collective security, is officially over. This is why Canada is also signing new deals with the EU like the CAEU which creates a formal security and defense partnership between Canada and the EU. This relationship opens the door for Canada to participate in ReArm Europe, the EU’s massive defense procurement program, all exclusive of U.S. participation. When it comes to trade, countries at the meeting in Davos in general are seeking a more predictable partner than the U.S. They are, especially France’s Macron, standing up to the Trump Administration when it comes to unilateral global decisions that greatly affect others involved in a particular group, like NATO. I do not see any mending of the fences in the near future with the U.S. and Canada, so this continuous friction is just a snowball rolling down a huge Canadian hill.

So, prior to this article becoming a book, because lord knows I have enough material regarding the global chaos, worth a mention are just a few more countries who are also in the Trump Administrations crosshairs: Cuba, Columbia, Nicaragua, Panama, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, and well, who knows, maybe even New Zealand. Why the hell not, let’s just throw it in there. You Kiwi’s better stay frosty! What if the U.S. were to invade New Zealand? This is an absolutely crazy stupid scenario to imagine but not much crazier than the U.S. invading Greenland. Let’s just call it another useful stress test for how deeply politics and trade chaos are wired together. A U.S. invasion of New Zealand would be seen as an attack on a close democratic partner and U.S. ally, very similar to that of invading an island, which is no more than a fishing village of 60,000 owned by Denmark. Today, the two countries describe their relationship as “broad and robust,” grounded in shared democratic values and a rules based order which many consider to be the foundation of exactly what makes trade possible in the first place. Key operative words in the previous sentence are “rules based.”

If the U.S. invaded New Zealand all existing trade frameworks and dialogues (like the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement signed in October of 1992) would effectively collapse. Shipping, insurance, and logistics involving U.S.–NZ routes would be disrupted or halted due to sanctions, boycotts, and security risks. Sanctions and diplomatic rupture would explode as NZ allies would join in the fight. New Zealand is tightly embedded in Western alliances and norms. They are also deeply attached to Australia, so they will get pulled into the fray along with Japan as Japan and Australia now have one of the strongest strategic partnerships in the Indo Pacific, not to mention Tasmania joining in, but its militarily is just a small extension of the Australian forces. It just sounds more wicked than it is to mess with Tasmania. (The Tasmanian Devil cartoons come to mind) New Zealand is a close U.S. partner in security, space cooperation, and digital governance via the Christchurch Call, Artemis Accords cracking down on extremist content online. The relationship is framed explicitly around the “international rules based order” like that of the EU and U.S. If the U.S. violated that order by invading New Zealand additional U.S. allies such as the EU, UK, and Canada would face enormous pressure to sanction the U.S. or at least restrict certain trade flows. There would be no backing down on a global scale as the EU has shown the U.S. by putting boots on the ground in Greenland. New Zealand would almost certainly seek coordinated economic responses with like minded democracies since the U.S. would no longer be considered one. Global companies would be forced into a choice of either maintaining access to U.S. markets or align with the sanctions and reputational risk. So, the trade impact wouldn’t be bilateral, and it would spill into U.S. trade with the greater democratic world. Sector impacts would come from food, aviation, and services. New Zealand’s top exports to the U.S. include frozen bovine meat, wine, and dairy products. Dairy being the largest export category. The U.S. exports aircraft, aircraft parts, and other high value industrial goods to New Zealand, which they can find elsewhere. When the U.S. invades food exports from NZ to the U.S. would likely be cut off by sanctions and global backlash. Aviation and defense related exports from the U.S. to NZ would halt immediately. Tourism and education flows (students, visitors, joint programs) would collapse—services trade would crater. This would hurt New Zealand more in relative terms (given its smaller economy), but the U.S. would take a huge reputational and strategic hit that spills into other trade relationships. Right now, New Zealand and the U.S. emphasize shared commitment to stability and cooperation, much like Greenland has over the years by allowing as many as ten U.S. military bases to occupy territory at one point. An invasion would flip that narrative on its head just as it has with the Greenland rhetoric from the Whitehouse. Greenland’s rhetoric has been quite blunt, telling the U.S. to pretty much just “F’ off. The U.S. would once again be seen as unpredictable and willing to use force against partners, which obviously is already the case on a global scale. Smaller countries would accelerate diversification away from U.S. dependence, and trade agreements where the U.S. seeks “high standard, 21st century” rules would further lose credibility. Possibly more credibility than it already has, but that’s a stretch. All of the turmoil doesn’t just affect U.S.–NZ trade—it raises the risk premium on trading with the U.S. at all on a global scale. New Zealand’s response, like Mexico and Canada’s would be the mapping of diversification and alignment with others besides the U.S. New Zealand already trades globally and has experience navigating big power politics. They would deepen trade ties with Asia, the EU, and other Pacific partners following Canada’s playbook. In the end, the U.S. would lose not just another trade partner, but a symbolically important, highly trusted ally. Imagine that.