Introduction

The Trump Administration is pursuing a new style of trade management based on use of tariffs to rectify trade deficits and to set new “reciprocal” tariff rates to level the playing field for all of its trading partners.  Critical minerals are a key component of the strategy, because the U.S. is heavily dependent of foreign sources for most of the critical minerals used in modern manufacturing.  In response to Trump-imposed tariffs and threats of other trade actions, China has repeatedly used export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals as leverage. This article looks at the current state of critical minerals trade actions, starting with new US agreements with multiple trading partners, then reviewing international norms and proceeding through other trade actions involving critical minerals.

Overview of 2025 Agreements Impacting Critical Minerals

The White House has been negotiating agreements with many trading partners in order to clarify the “Reciprocal Tariff” level to be applied to each signatory, while fostering investment in the US, clarifying certain aspects of trade issues including critical minerals access and export controls, as well as other issues that are priorities for the White House.  This section looks at the results of several of these agreements on critical minerals trade.

1. United States–Australia Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths

On October 20, 2025, President Trump and Prime Minister Albanese signed the United States–Australia Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths at the White House. Key elements of the agreement include joint project selection for mining, processing, and refining critical minerals and rare earths.  Use of both governments’ financing tools with an emphasis on defense, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing uses. The hope is that it will encourage  large U.S. equity stakes and offtake arrangements in Australian projects, including rare earths and battery minerals. It offers U.S. manufacturers an alternative source for rare earths and battery metals that still enjoys tariff advantages over China under the Section 301 regime.  It also indicates to markets that Australia is the preferred Pacific hub for critical-mineral-to-magnet and battery value chains serving the U.S.

2. United States–Japan Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths

On October 27–28, 2025, the U.S. and Japan signed a Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing, accompanied by broader trade and technology “prosperity” announcements. (United States – Japan Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing – The White House)  The framework commits both countries to coordinated investments, stockpiling, and trade measures to secure critical minerals.  It builds on the 2023 U.S.–Japan critical minerals agreement that made Japanese EV-related minerals eligible under U.S. clean-vehicle tax credits. (U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement: Background and Issues for Congress (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48676.)  Japan is developing as a processing and technology hub, with the U.S. providing political cover and demand guarantees.  It encourages joint investment in third-country mining projects (particularly in Southeast Asia and Africa) that can ship into both markets without Chinese processing. Finally, the private sector may locate refining, magnet manufacturing, and cathode production in Japan or the U.S., rather than in China.

3. United States–Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade & Export-Control Alignment

On October 26, 2025, the U.S. and Malaysia signed a Reciprocal Trade Agreement, framed as part of a broader set of Southeast Asian deals. (Agreement Between the United States of America and Malaysia on Reciprocal Trade – The White House).  This accord commits Malaysia to provide detailed information on industrial subsidies and to address distortive mechanisms. It strengthens Malaysia’s position as a rare-earths and advanced-materials processing hub aligned with U.S. export-control policy, potentially capturing activity that might otherwise have gravitated toward China-centric complexes.  U.S. firms may see it as an incentive to route some processing steps through Malaysia to maintain compliance with both U.S. export controls and any future Section 232 critical-mineral rules.

4. U.S.–Thailand MoU on Diversifying Critical-Minerals Supply Chains

A White House MoU with Thailand on cooperation to diversify global critical-minerals supply chains describes a joint agenda on exploration, extraction, processing, and recycling of critical minerals and rare earths. (Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand Concerning Cooperation to Diversify Global Critical Minerals Supply Chains and Promote Investments – The White House).  It positions Thailand as a prospective downstream processing and recycling hub serving both Japanese and American manufacturers.  It also adds secondary supply for  recycled magnets and battery materials, to deal with potential  Section 232 duties constraining primary processed minerals.

5. Critical Minerals Framework with Saudi Arabia

In November 2025, during a high-profile visit by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia concluded a Critical Minerals Framework as part of a broader economic, defense and AI package. (Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Solidifies Economic and Defense Partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – The White House). The framework is described as channeling Saudi capital into U.S. (and allied) critical-mineral projects and aligning long-term strategies for supply chains needed in civil nuclear, energy transition, and defense.  It could generate tens of billions of dollars in Saudi investment in U.S. and third-country critical-mineral projects, moving beyond oil-and-gas finance.  It also gives the U.S. another large-scale financier to counter Chinese funding of resource-rich states, particularly in Africa and Asia.

6. U.S.–Indonesia Trade Agreement and Lifting of Mineral Export Restrictions

A July 2025 U.S.–Indonesia trade deal is explicitly linked to removing Indonesian restrictions on exports of critical minerals to the United States, including nickel, copper and bauxite, in exchange for lower U.S. tariffs (19% instead of a threatened 32%) and broader market access. ( Fact Sheet: The United States and Indonesia Reach Historic Trade Deal – The White House). It ensures access to Indonesian nickel for U.S. buyers, while Indonesia maintains export bans and restrictions targeting other markets. U.S. companies will be able to bypass China-controlled smelters, potentially altering the economics of EV battery material sourcing.

7. U.S.–China One-Year Trade Package on Rare Earths and Tariffs

On November 1, 2025, the White House announced a one-year U.S.–China economic and trade agreement under which China agreed to: (Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Strikes Deal on Economic and Trade Relations with China – The White House).  The accord suspends and could lead to elimination of export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals. It removes retaliatory tariffs imposed in response to U.S. measures and expands market access for U.S. agriculture, including soybeans.  The U.S. suspended Section 301 maritime/shipbuilding tariffs and eased shipping-related fees for Chinese vessels. The opening of rare-earth and magnet markets benefits the U.S. and the EU. , which separately welcomed China’s 12-month suspension of rare-earth export controls. (AP News) The one-year term of the agreement provides only a temporary reprieve, not a strategic reversal of Chinese control so firms will continue to diversify supply in case controls return in 2026.

8. U.S.–Korea “Technology Prosperity Deal” and Trade Agreement

A technology-focused framework with South Korea announced in late October and fleshed out in mid-November 2025 includes cooperation on AI, semiconductors, shipbuilding and critical minerals, alongside Korean investment commitments of roughly $150 billion in U.S. shipbuilding and other sectors. (Joint Fact Sheet on President Donald J. Trump’s Meeting with President Lee Jae Myung – The White House). The U.S. hopes the large Korean conglomerates will  invest in processing, battery manufacturing and cathode/anode plants in the U.S. and allied countries, leveraging Section 301 and potential 232 outcomes. Coordinating export controls and investment screening with Korea may impact China’s access to high-end Korean technology needed to exploit critical-mineral advantages.

9. Latin American “Reciprocal Trade Frameworks”

In November 2025, the White House announced trade frameworks with Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala, largely focused on reciprocal tariff cuts, non-tariff barrier reduction, and digital-trade disciplines. (Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Announces Historic Trade Deals with Western Hemisphere Trading Partners – The White House)  Argentina is home to major lithium resources and growing copper projects.  By improving broader U.S.–Argentina trade relations and reducing tariffs U.S. firms may increase investment in Argentine minerals projects. The frameworks set precedents for conditional tariff reductions, which could later be tied to critical-mineral investment or export-control cooperation.  The primary significance of the agreements is strategic: locking key Latin American partners into the U.S. “reciprocal framework” leading to critical-mineral deals in the future.  

Foreign Actions on Critical Minerals

The emphasis on critical minerals is playing out in a variety of fora.  The G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan commits these major economies to coordinate responses to deliberate market disruptions and to diversify mining, processing and recycling away from concentrated suppliers, especially China. (G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan (17/06/2025) – G7/G20 Documents Database).  The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) moved into active implementation, setting targets for domestic extraction, processing and recycling and capping reliance on any single foreign supplier at 65% of consumption for each material. (Critical Raw Materials Act – Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs).  

U.S. Trade Actions on Critical Minerals in 2025

New Section 232 Investigation on Processed Critical Minerals

On April 15–17, 2025, President Trump directed the Commerce Department to launch a Section 232 investigation into imports of “processed critical minerals” and their derivative products, covering oxides, salts, metals and downstream items based on them. Lists in public filings include lithium, beryllium, indium, and various rare earths. (Ensuring National Security and Economic Resilience Through Section 232 Actions on Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products – The White House). The investigation is ongoing and as of late November 2025, no final report or tariff proclamation has been issued.  Commerce and industry submissions emphasize defense, energy, and semiconductor applications, arguing that foreign, especially Chinese, dominance in processing creates a vulnerability analogous to the earlier dependence on imported steel and aluminum. The Administration also links the probe to its reciprocal tariff agenda, signaling that countries limiting exports or using dual-use export controls on critical minerals may face security-based tariffs in response. The investigation has increased financing costs for projects that rely heavily on imported processed minerals, particularly in magnets, battery precursors and super-hard materials. It also has strengthened the case for U.S. and allied investment in domestic processing projects, anticipating possible 232 duties in 2026.

Continuation of China Section 301 Tariffs and Limited Exclusions

Existing Section 301 tariffs on Chinese goods (originally imposed 2018–2019) remain in force, covering around $370 billion of imports, including a wide range of products containing critical minerals (batteries, permanent magnets, electronics, EV components, solar equipment). (Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status (2025), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48549.) Exclusions for solar manufacturing equipment and 178 other products were extended to November 29, 2025, offering limited relief for some clean-energy supply chains. Many product-specific exclusions from earlier years have expired, leaving more critical-mineral-intensive products exposed to the 7.5–25% duties. Officially, Section 301 remains grounded in findings of unfair Chinese practices: forced technology transfer, IP theft, and non-market industrial policies. The tariffs also support the Administration’s broader goal of re-routing critical-mineral value chains away from China, even where evidence of specific unfair practices in those sectors is weaker. The new agreements will encourages investors to structure projects so that the highest-value transformation steps occur in countries with preferential access to the U.S. 

Overall Impact and Emerging Themes

• Managing U.S. Dependence on China. The one-year suspensions of export controls and retaliatory tariffs creates breathing room without removing China’s underlying leverage.  
• Agreements Open Access. Section 232 and 301 tools remain in place or are being expanded (e.g., critical minerals investigation), but Deals with Indonesia, Japan, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Saudi Arabia and even China itself can be read as tariff-for-minerals swaps.
• Rise of “Trusted” Processing Hubs. Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea are increasingly positioned as trusted processing and manufacturing hubs, where upstream resources from third countries can be transformed without losing access to U.S. markets or running afoul of U.S. export controls. 
• Investment Realignment.  U.S. government stakes in private sector critical mineral companies, plus the nearly $1 billion in proposed U.S. critical minerals funding, underscore a shift toward direct state involvement in supply chains. Saudi capital and Japanese/Korean corporate investment add further weight, creating a strong investment coalition seeking projects outside of Chinese domination.
• Compliance Strategy for Firms.  Companies trading or investing in critical minerals will look more closely at the location of both mining and processing.  Exposure to Section 301 and 232 duties and eligibility under various bilateral frameworks will hinge on where materials are refined and where value is added. Contracting and project finance must account for the short duration of the Chinese export controls, the possibility of increases in U.S. tariffs and how to align with the new agreements.